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The dominant image of the 21ste century is that of the network society in which information 
and communication networks and infrastructures play an important role. Looking at the 
functioning of these networks we see that ICT networks and infrastructures are interconnected 
with at least two other types of networks and infrastructures. First, there are socio-
organizational networks of groups of people and organizations.  They use ICT-networks to 
exchange and share information as well as to communicate which one another. Secondly, 
there are physical and logistical networks and infrastructures that are used to transport 
commodities like gas, electricity, water, goods and people. ICT-networks are very often 
embedded in these logistical networks, for instance to provide the necessary energy or to 
monitor the movements of these commodities during its transportation. These three kinds of 
networks and infrastructures are increasingly interconnected and they can be seen as the 
backbone of our daily life and our daily practices. The result is a multiplying vulnerability for 
disturbances. These disturbances can bring our daily activities to a standstill. For instance, a 
major disturbance in the computer network (ICT-network) of the railways leads to a standstill 
of the rail traffic (physical network); while in large metropolitan areas thousands of people are 
not able to reach their working places (socio-organizational network).  
 
In this paper we want to address the question what the increasing interconnectedness of ICT, 
physical and socio-organizational networks implies for the development of governance 
models regarding the management of vulnerability and risk. We will show that the standard 
reaction of governments to address the vulnerabilities related to the interconnectedness of 
networks is highly underestimated. And when it is addressed, it is organized from an internal, 
task-oriented perspective. The structure of our paper is organized around the following 
sections. First we will focus – in section two - on a number of characteristics of the network 
society and we will try to understand the vulnerabilities and risks, which are related to the 
emergence and functioning of network society. In section three we will follow a random 
person and show how his daily activities are supported by and embedded in the 
interconnection of ICT, socio-organizational and physical networks. In section four we show 
how Dutch governments react to the possible risks that are at stake. In the last section we will 
broaden our scope and address the fundamental question what kind of governance models 
governments can use to deal with the vulnerabilities of the network society and what these 
models imply for the relationship between government and citizens. A strategic agenda for 
discussion will be proposed. (1) 
 
 
2. Interconnected risks in the network society   
 
In this section we look at a number of theoretical notions, which can be used to get a better 
understanding of the network society, its interconnectedness and its vulnerabilities. 
 
 
2.1 The concept of the network society 
 
In the eyes of Castells (1996, 1997, 1998) the network society can be seen as the result of a 
paradigm shift, in which the predominantly locally organized industrial society of the 19th 
century has been transformed into the global network society of the 21st century. This shift is 
the result of fundamental change in the dominant production technology of capitalist 
economies and modern (western) societies: “ a technology based primarily on cheap inputs of 
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energy to one predominantly based on cheap inputs of information derived from the advances 
of microelectronic and telecommunication technology “ (Castells, 1996:61).  The first 
characteristic of this ‘technological paradigm’ is that information is its raw material: all these 
new technologies are to act on information, not just information to act on technology, as was 
the case in the industrial revolution. The second feature is the pervasiveness of effects of new 
technologies. Because information is an integral part of all human activity, all processes of 
our individual and collective existence are directly shaped by ICT. The third characteristic 
refers to the networking logic of these new technologies. The morphology of the network 
seems to be well adapted to the increasing complexity of interaction and to the unpredictable 
patterns that emerge from this interaction. Network technology and the digitalization of 
commodities and processes (Negroponte, 1995) makes it possible to create rather flexible 
connections between, for instance people and organizations, that cross traditional 
geographical, temporal and functional boundaries (Bekkers, 1998). Flexibility is the fourth 
feature that can be mentioned, while the convergence of specific technologies into a highly 
integrated system is the last characteristic of this new technological paradigm. 
Microelectronics, telecommunications, bio- and opt electronics and computers are now all 
integrated into comprehensive systems.  
The persistence of this new technological paradigm leads to social and economic conditions in 
which the nature of the production is focused on the production of information processing 
itself, the production of information processing devices and on the management of 
information processing (Castells, 1996:67).  Moreover, the economy of the information 
society is a global economy: it is a economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real-time 
on a planetary scale, which uses ICT-networks to create new production and competition 
conditions that are based on the creation of information spaces (Castells, 1996: 92).   
Castells (1996:412) uses two notions to describe the creation of informational spaces on a 
planetary scale. The first notion is that of ‘a space of flows’ which can be described as the 
“material organization of time sharing practices that works through flows” (of capital, words, 
images, sounds, interactions etcetera).  This space of flows can be described as a combination 
of at least three layers of material that support the constitution of it. The first layer is the 
circuit of electronic impulses, the network of interconnected technological systems 
themselves like for instance microelectronics, telecommunications, computer processing and 
broadcasting system (Castells, 1996:412). Its nodes and hubs constitute the second layer of 
the space of flows. An electronic network is always linked to specific places, with well-
defined social, cultural, physical and functional characteristics (Castells, 1996:413). Some 
places are exchangers and function as a communication and coordination hub to facilitate the 
smooth interaction of all the elements integrated into the network. Other places are nodes of 
the network that are the location of strategically important functions that built a series of 
locality-based activities and organizations around a key function in the network. The location 
in the node links up the locality with the whole network. Wall Street can be seen as a node in 
the global financial market system, which is highly computerized. The third layer refers to the 
spatial organization of the dominant, technical, financial and managerial elites (Castells, 
1996:415), who through hubs and nodes have access to the space of flows. The second notion 
Castells uses to describe this new informational space is that of ‘timeless time’, which is 
formulated as “the systematic perturbation in the sequential order of phenomena performed 
(..) Perturbation may take the form of compressing the occurrence of phenomena, aiming at 
instantaneity, or else by introducing random discontinuity in the sequence eternity” (Castells, 
1996:464). An example is the Black Monday crash in the late eighties in Wall Street which 
had at the same time enormous local and global effects, due to the connection of electronic 
bidding systems by network technology. At the same time this examples illustrates that the 




2.2 The concept of the risk society 
 
Another author who is relevant for our research goal and which cannot be missed to 
understand the nature of interconnected networks is Beck. Disasters, like fire, war, famine and 
floods, are of all times. However, the modernization process that started with the process of 
industrialization in the 18th century has produced new risks. Before the industrial revolution 
the confrontation with risks was a confrontation with the will of God (Beck, 1999:50). In the 
19th and 20th century our assessment of risks and dangers has changed. Risk full behavior is 
seen as source of danger, which can be traced by looking at the decisions and consideration of 
utilities that have been made. These decisions may have intended and unintended 
consequences that produce specific risks and dangers. As a result of this changing perspective 
on risk assessment, the so-called ‘calculus of risk’ has been introduced, which connects the 
physical, the engineering and the social sciences’. Risks can be calculated and can be 
(statistically) described as events, which make them to a certain degree understandable and 
manageable. Moreover, the calculation of risks makes it possible to buy off such a risk by 
taking out an insurance policy and/or by taking counter measures, like technical adjustments. 
In the calculus of risk, the governance of risk is seen as a process of social engineering that 
permits a type of ‘technological moralization’ (Beck, 1994:51-52).  Technological 
moralization refers to a process in which paying an insurance premium can pay off risk full 
behavior or it can be neutralized in terms of a minimum percentage of occurrences. The result 
is a monopolization of the way modern societies define and deal with risks, of the way 
knowledge about the causes and effects of potential risks is presented, and actions are or will 
be taken (Beck, 1999:59). The assessment of risk and risk full behavior is no longer the 
subject of moral, ethical and individual considerations; it de-individualizes and is not the 
subject of political debate. 
The dominance of the ‘calculus of risk’ obscures the perspective on a process which Beck 
(1999:73) has called ‘reflexive modernization’: the transition from the industrial to the risk 
epoch of modernity occurs unintentionally, unseen, compulsively, in the course of a dynamic 
of modernization which has made itself autonomous, on the pattern of unintended 
consequences. The risk society is not an option that can be chosen or rejected in the course of 
political debate. It arises through the automatic operation of autonomous modernization 
processes that are blind and deaf to the consequences and dangers. In total, and latently, these 
produce hazards, which call into question the basis of the industrial society. In contrast to 
earlier industrial risks, these new biological (the rise of the BSE disease), chemical (the 
explosion of a dioxin plant in Seweso, Italy), nuclear (the explosion of a nuclear plant in 
Chernobyl), environmental (the Ozone-layer) an genetic engineering (DNA manipulation and 
food production) risks can a) be limited in terms of neither time or place, b) are not 
accountable according to established rules of causality, blame and liability, because of its 
complexity, dynamics and overwhelming number of involved actors and c) cannot be 
compensated for or insured against (Beck, 1999:77; 54). They become an event with a 
beginning and no end; an open ended festival of creeping, galloping and overlapping waves of 
destruction, according to Beck (1999:54). The only way out is to create a process of self-
confrontation with the consequences of the risk society by increasing the reflexive capacity of 
the modernization process itself (Beck, 1999:73). A necessary condition for establishing this 
reflexive capacity is to break up the monopoly of how risks are being defined and perceived. 
In a risk society that identifies itself as such, the critique should be democratized (Beck, 
1999:79). Social self-critique is needed, which can overcome an industrialized society with a 
‘truncated’ democracy, in which questions of the technological change of society remain 
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beyond the reach of political-parliamentary decision-making (Beck, 1999:70). This can be 
established by a further separation of powers between the political and economic-
technological powers, and by the creation of a free public sphere, in which an open and public 
debate can be organized (Beck, 1999:70-71). 
 
 
2.3 The cultural and institutional bias of risk 
 
Can we know the risks we face? This is the title of the first chapter of Douglas & Wildavsky’s 
book ‘Risk and Culture’. Risk and uncertainty are two sides of the same coin. Knowledge 
about risks is surrounded by uncertainty, but the ultimate question is, how should we assess 
this uncertainty? The assessment of risk is a highly subjective matter. The assessment of risks 
is a process that not only takes place on the individual and micro-level, but also on meso, 
group level and a macro, societal level. How do groups or communities assess events as 
risky? The assessment of an event as a risk full event is a joint product of knowledge about 
the future and consent about the most desired prospects.  In Douglas and Wildavsky’s 
(1983:4) perspective the ultimate challenge in the process of risk assessment is to create a 
common perception, understanding a definition of – and thus agreement on – risk. In most 
cases knowledge is uncertain and/or the criteria and norms people use to assess these risks 
also differ. The process of the selection and definition of events as risky events is about 
acceptability, which is always a political issue. There is no single correct conception of risk; 
there is no way to get everyone else to accept ‘it’. Risk assessment should be seen from a 
cultural perspective, looking at cultural bias, which is embedded in each social arrangement, 
for instance a group, an organization or a society. The choice of risks and the choice how to 
live are taken together. Each social arrangement has its own risk portfolio, in which common 
values lead to common fears and vice versa. As Douglas and Wildavsky (1983:8) put it “risk 
taking and risk aversion, shared confidence and shared fears, are part of the dialogue on how 
to organize social relations. For to organize, means to organize some things in and other 
things out”. This notion implies that a cultural analysis of risk assessment, risk taking and risk 
avoiding is a meaningful way of looking at risks. How do actors or social institutions define 
risks, which norms and values lay behind this definition, which interests are at stake and how 
do actors communicate about their definition of risk in order to create a shared understanding 
about the nature of certain events? It is the social environment that defines which dangers are 
worth attention (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983:9). 
 
Hood et al. (2001:6) focuses on the question how governments try to regulate societal risks. 
The result is a policy and intellectual archipelago or risk domains isolated from one another, 
with different policy stance across various domains. Each domain has its own risk regulation 
regime. By using the concept of a regime Hood et al. try to analyze the definition of risks and 
the measures which are taken to control the emerge of these risks, from an institutional 
perspective. In this perspective it is interesting to look for the ‘rules’ that influence the 
definition of risk and risk policies. Rules are “the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, 
strategies, organizational forms and technologies around which (...) activity is constructed. 
We also mean the beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge that surround, support, 
elaborate and contradict these roles and routines” (March & Olsen, 1989; 22; see also 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
The result is a broad variety of risks and risk regimes. This variety shows that the notion of 
the risk society is too broad and too abstract. The variety of the regime content, particularly 
the size of the regulatory effort, can largely be explained by features of the regime context, 
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which is rather dynamic. Moreover, Hood et al (2001:174) draw the conclusion that within 
many regimes a coherent control system is lacking.  
 
 
2.4 Bringing the ideas together 
 
We have looked at a number of relevant theoretical ideas, which can be used to understand the 
risks that are emerging from the interconnection of ICT, physical and socio-organizational 
networks as well as to understand how societies and governments assess these risks. At the 
end of this section we will bring some of these ideas together. 
 
Understanding the origin of interconnected risks 
The following notions are important to understand the origin of the risks that emerge from the 
interconnection of networks: 
• Castells shows how ICT has penetrated in all the domains of human activity, not as an 
exogenous source of impact, but as a fabric in which such activity is woven (Castells, 
1996:31). This observation justifies the central question in our paper: what does the 
interconnectedness of ICT, physical and socio-organizational networks imply for the 
interdependencies and vulnerabilities which are embedded in their interconnectedness; 
• The vulnerabilities of Castells’ network society become manifest in the location of 
certain ‘hubs’ and ‘nodes’ in the space of flows. It are these ‘hubs’ and ‘nodes’ in 
which the interconnectedness of ICT, physical and socio-organizational networks is 
organized. Moreover, disturbances in the global space of flows of timesharing 
activities and interactions lead to local and global risks; 
• The network society can be seen as the result of a process of modernization, which 
autonomous logic produces unintended consequences, which manifest themselves as 
events with a beginning but and no end, with local and global effects; 
• The perception and definition of risks, emerging from the interconnectedness of 
networks, is highly subjective and biased from a cultural perspective, in which it is 
important to look for a common values and norms; and  
• The perception and definition of risks, emerging from the interconnectedness of 
networks is influenced by the ‘rules’ that are embedded in government organizations 
and in risk regulation regimes. 
 
The changing nature of the risks in the network society  
If we look at the work of the authors we have studied, we see that the risks in the evolving 
network society are changing if we compare them with the risks in the industrial society. 
Some talk about  ‘new’ risks in relation to ‘old’ risks (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983:16). New 
risks are hidden (we shall not know we are encountering them), the dangers are involuntary 
(we would not willingly accept them) and they are irreversible (there is no turning back). If 
we try to bring this characterization of the so-called ‘new’ risks a step further, which 
dimensions can be seen? 
 
• The broadening of risks. The interconnection of networks and the existence of 
interconnected risks can lead to spill-over and snowball-effects, which will penetrate 
other domains and activities; 
• The deepening of risks. Events can hit a node in the networks, which can be seen as 
hitting the hart of the network, leading to a severe crisis. An example is the crash of 
the Twin Towers in Manhattan that also hit the heart of the financial system; 
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• The acceleration of risks. The real-time or timeless nature of the network society can 
generate harmful effects in seconds. Computer viruses demonstrate this each time 
again.   
• The glocalization of risks. Disturbances in interconnected networks, which support 
worldwide economic, financial, military and other operations and activities, do not 
only have global effects, but also have local effects that can vary in intensity. At the 
same time local distortions can spread themselves, using these networks, and generate 
worldwide effects. The SARS virus is an example of a local disease which has spread 
by using global (air traffic) infrastructures; 
• The subjectivity of risks. The risks in the network society are culturally and 
institutionally biased, which can lead to different perceptions of risks and different risk 
avoiding or risk taking activities by the nodes in the network or the different parties 
that are gathered around a node. 
 
Dealing with risks 
How can we deal with the vulnerabilities that emerge from the interconnection of networks, 
and what does this imply for the role of government?  Analyzing the literature that is used in 
this paper, the following observation can be made: 
• The global interconnectedness of ICT, socio-organizational and physical networks 
limits the capacity to take effective risk avoiding measures or to handle crisis. The 
interconnectedness of networks fundamentally challenges one of the core tasks of 
government: preserving safety, and thus challenges the legitimacy of the sovereign 
state (Castells, 1997:243);  
• Question marks can be put at the capacity of governments or the capacity of the state 
to influence the shaping and functioning of the network society and spaces of flows 
that constitute this new society. Castells (1998:347) sees a crisis of the nation-state as 
a sovereign entity as well as a related crises of representative democracy as a result a 
blurring boundaries of sovereignty. The existing geometry power, which is based on 
the idea of the hierarchical state, will be replaced by a new geometry of power, that of 
the horizontal, multilateral, decentralized and fragmentized network state;  
• According to Castells (1998:347) icons, symbols and symbolism in politics play an 
important role in the network society (‘the medium is the message’, to quote 
McLuhan), which implies that risk management policies in the network society will 
also be highly symbolic; 
• It is important to look how government (and societies) defines and select events as 
harm full events, which ask for government intervention. What is the cultural and 
institutional bias of relevant stakeholders that lay behind the definition and selection 
of these risks? In relation to our research goal, it is important to look how 
governments define the interconnection of networks as a risk full development. In this 
definition it is important to look at the frames of references which are used, and how 
these frames of references are influenced by the institutional setting in which they are 
developed, used and reproduced (Douglas & Wildavksy, 1983; Hood et al., 2001) 
• Beck (1998) points at the one-dimensional, techno-economic definition of risks and 
risk avoidance. Risk management is predominantly seen as ‘social engineering’. 
Defining risk management as the management of the safety chain, in which effective 
management is seen as establishing a smooth coordination of separate activities, which 
together constitute the chain, is an example of a social engineering approach of risk 
avoidance. In order to break up the one-dimensionality of risk management policies, 
Beck (1998) pleads for the democratization of the discussion about risks, which 
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emerge from the modernization of society, in which alternative risk definitions can 
compete with the existing ones; and  
• According to Hood et al. (2001) the governance of risk can be facilitated, if we are 
able to increase the learning capacities in policy networks by enhancing the variety 
and overlap of perspectives and risk regulation regimes. However, the control systems 
within a risk regulation regime are so badly organized and maintained, that it is 
important to improve these control systems first before we can ask the question, how 
to improve these learning capacities.   
 
 
3. Traveling through the network society 
 
In this section we reconstruct the life of a random person by following him during one day. In 
this reconstruction of some events during this day we will show, how his activities are 
embedded in (interconnected) networks and which possible risks he faces. We reconstruct the 
risk from the perspective of an ordinary citizen. 
 
Events Involved networks Examples of connected risks 
Wake up and  
Get up 




Food safety (breakfast) 





No warm water 
No telephone use 
No use of the computer 
Short circuit on electricity (fire) 
No use of domestic appliances 
Train accident 
Collision on the street 
(Indirect) Health damage by food 
poisoning/waste disposal 
 
Go to work Rail-infrastructure 
Communications-infrastructure (newspaper) 
Traffic-infrastructure 





Incomplete or inaccurate information 
(manipulation) (newspaper) 
Accident on the street 
No entrance to the office 
Getting stuck in the elevator 
At the office Communication networks (laptop, telephone, 
GroupWise, mail, post) 
Electricity network (light, coffee machine, 
computer) 
Water-infrastructure (coffee, toilet) 
Security networks (password on computer) 
Personal networks (talking with colleagues) 
No post, email of manipulated email 
Viruses on computer 
No electricity 
No water or polluted water 
No entrance to the computer systems 
Meeting outside the 
office 
Communications network (intranet) 
Electricity network (reserving a bike by 
intranet) 
Traffic-infrastructure (bike) 
Social networks (meeting) 
Security network (entrance-badge, checking 
in) 
Collision on the street 
No reservation for a bike 
No entrance 
Computer network down 
Manipulation of information 
Identity-fraud (internet) 
Riding home by car Traffic-infrastructure (car and parking 
badge) 
Traffic circulation system (traffic lights) 
Communication-infrastructure (car-stereo) 
Fuel-provision (LP Gas) 
 
Traffic accident 
Disordered Traffic (Traffic lights not 
working) 
No radio-transmission 
No Fuel for car 
 






If we look at the risks as described above, it is interesting to change the perspective from a 
citizen-oriented perspective towards a government-oriented perspective. We have selected a 
number of government organizations that are responsible for the development and 
implementation of risk policies in the geographical and functional area in which our random 
person works and travels. How do these organizations define these risks? Do they relate these 
risks to the increasing interconnection of ICT, physical and socio-organizational networks?  
What actions do they take?  
We have analyzed the official policy documents of the following public authorities: 
• The policy document on integral safety of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Integraal 
Veiligheids Programma), which address the problem of the safety of citizens in the 
public domain;  
• The policy document on external safety of the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing 
and the Environment; 
• The integral safety policy document of the Province of South-Holland, which 
addresses all the events and situations which are potentially harmful in the region and 
for which this regional authority is responsible (Integrale Veiligheidsnota Provincie 
Zuid-Holland); 
• Several documents regarding the safety of citizens for which the municipality of The 
Hague is responsible, which were available at the website www.denhaag.nl; 
• The policy document on railway safety of the Ministry of Traffic (Nota 
Railveiligheid); 
• The Action program on Terrorism and Safety of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and 
Defence (Actieprogramma Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid); 
• The policy document on vulnerabilities on the Internet of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (Nota Kwetsbaarheden op het internet-Kwint). 
 
We will not discuss the individual documents, but we will draw some conclusions, using the 
format of section 2.4 
 
Understanding the origin of interconnected risks 
A great number of policy documents point out the vulnerabilities that result from the 
increasing interconnectedness of social, organizational and ICT-infrastructures. Especially, in 
those places where the infrastructures meet. At the same time there is more attention for the 
independent meaning of ICT-infrastructures. The Risk-society is a well-known notion that 
mainly is used as a concept to position risks in the present era. This is especially so for the 
policy documents on the national level. They mainly deal with the general safety policy at the 
macro-level. This is different at the middle- and micro level of provinces and the local 
communities. At these levels risks are usually not associated with the interconnectedness of 
infrastructures, but with risky behavior of persons, groups and organizations. Therefore, the 
policy is aimed at reducing this behavior. This accounts for the fact that a lot of attention is 
given to measures that aim at eliminating the source or minimizing the effect of this kind of 
behavior.  
 
The changing nature of the risks 
In the different policy documents no analysis is made of the changing nature of the risks in the 
network society by linking them to an interwoven infrastructures. An almost immediate 
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reduction of complexity is often at hand. This is the case in the policy document on integral 
safety, in the Action program on Terrorism and Safety and in the policy document on 
vulnerabilities on the Internet. The policy document on railway safety mainly addresses 
physical risks and emphasizes the development of personal injury and material damage. Risks 
within the ICT-infrastructure are at the center in the policy document on vulnerabilities on the 
Internet. The Action program on Terrorism and Safety focuses on ‘classical’ forms of 
criminal behavior that is carried out by using modern means and by making use of the 
vulnerabilities of our modern society. Also the policy document on integral safety reduces the 
complexity of reality. It focuses on fighting the trouble that is caused by crime within the 
public space. We conclude that in the policy document on external safety from the Ministry of 
Spatial Planning, Housing and the Environment and the integral safety policy document of the 
Province of South-Holland, an important role is played by the spatial embedded ness of risks 
which makes it possible to localize these risks and to know them. In these documents it is not 
fully recognized that new risks with a different character are emerging.   
 
Dealing with risks 
Different documents bring up the role of government in dealing with risks and the 
consequences of this role for the legitimacy of government. Protection against these risks is 
seen as an assignment for government. However, this does not relieve citizens, companies 
other government organizations or societal organizations from there own responsibility in this 
domain. Yet another conclusion that can be drawn relates to the thought that risks, at least to a 
certain limit, can be controlled and that they are amendable by forms of ‘social engineering’. 
This controllability rests upon two assumptions. The first is the assumption that risks can be 
known and can be localized. Risk analysis and inventories of risks are important for the 
control and reduction of risks (see for example the integral safety policy document of the 
Province of South-Holland). The idea that working with a safety chain results in a better 
control over risks is the second assumption. Then, important in controlling risks are: 
- A better information supply that crosses organizational borders; 
- A better coordination between the links in the safety chain; 
- A further integration of tasks between the links in the chain; and 
- More attention to the prevention of risks. 
In addition to this, ICT’s are more and more seen as a deus-ex-machine. Due to the exchange 
and sharing of information and knowledge and communication, the use of modern ICT’s leads 
to a better information supply within the safety chain. Furthermore, the use of modern ICT’s 
contributes to the fact that risks can be known, for example by supporting policy development 
and decision-making. ICT’s also accounts for a further rationalization of the controllability of 
risks. 
Earlier we have pointed out that in general in the policy documents risks are often recognized 
as a result of the interconnectedness of infrastructures. However in most of these documents a 
quick reduction of complexity takes place. This is due to the fact that the definition of risks 
and the way in which to deal with them takes place on the basis of the tasks, the 
responsibilities, the routines and the authority of a government organization. It could be stated 
that this leads to a demand-oriented approach of risks. With it goes that maintenance of laws 
and rules (especially permits) is accentuated. 
 
 
4. The governance of risk: three models 
 
The governance of risk can be seen as dealing with a ‘wicked problem’. Our understanding of 
the nature of the variety of potential risks (which emerges from the interconnection of ICT 
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networks, socio-organizational networks and physical networks) is limited. Clear causal 
relations cannot be discerned.  We also do not know if the measures which has been taken to 
avoid possible risks, are sufficient enough. Moreover, we do not how we should assess these 
risks in a political way. The normative framework to assess the measures to be taken is 
permanently in discussion, for instance in relation to privacy issues. At the same time we see 
that a broad variety of public, semi-public and private organizations are dealing with the 
problem, which leads to all kinds of multi layer and multifunctional communication and 
coordination problems.  
 
In essence we discern three governance models that can be used as a perspective to address 
the problem of the governance of risk. In each model there is one dominant, but different 
coordination mechanism, which has different effects on the role and position of government 
and the citizens in dealing with the risk that emerge for the interconnection of ICT, socio-
organizational and physical networks. After we have described each model, we will draw 
some conclusions and formulate a number of strategic question and dilemmas. 
 
4.1 The state: the governance of risk as a problem of ‘command and control’ 
 
Because of their impact on society, safety and vulnerability problems are in this model seen as 
assignments for government. Two variations can be seen within this model. In the first, safety 
is viewed as a managerial administrative problem in which maintenance and supervision on 
the execution of rules is a central issue. In the second, safety is seen as a technological 
question. ICT’s should be used to narrowly monitor behavior and movements and to make 
them visible. Interventions can then take place earlier and easier.  
The cybernetic model of steering (Van Gunsteren, 1976) lies at the basis of these two 
‘command and control’ approaches of safety problems. Typical for this model is the idea that 
the government is situated at one central point above society and is capable to perform 
preventive as well as corrective interventions. Crucial for this is an information supply that is 
functioning optimally. For its interventions the government has a number of instruments to its 
disposal that can be used for supervision, inspection and monitoring. It concerns for example 
legal competences to exercise administrative pressure, such as the closing of dangerous 
objects, the withdrawal or suspension of permits, the enforcement of fines and the distribution 
of warnings. 
 
From this model viewed safety risks are control issues. Central control is seen as the 
strengthening of the ability of a government organization to supervise. This can be realized in 
three different ways. The first is to integrate inspection agencies. The assumption behind this 
is that an integral approach is needed to deal with the complexity of most policy areas. The 
second way is to support supervision by improving the information supply for an 
organization, for example by developing monitoring systems based upon a ‘will to know’ 
(Bekkers, 1994). The third and last way is to extend and refine legal competences to 
intervene, especially from the viewpoint of administrative and criminal law. 
 
Central in the technological variation of the cybernetic ‘command and control’ approach are 
the so-called ‘safety enhancing technologies’. A lot of significance is attached to the detection 
ability of these technologies (Bullinga, 2002). The most well known example is the use of 
video-surveillance in buildings and public spaces, even in streets. The ability to detect is the 
result of technological developments. One of these is the fact that computer technology is 
becoming smaller and smaller. Therefore, people, buildings, goods, appliances and animals 
are more often provided with chip or mobile technology. As a result local intelligence is being 
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realized that can be detected at distance. The infrastructures needed are provided by a further 
integration between ICT and other networks (such as television and video). This development 
is sometimes referred to as ‘embedded internet’. This detection model is also based upon a 
cybernetic steering model; from a central point it is possible to monitor the behavior and 
movements of people and for example vehicles and to intervene if this is necessary.  
 
Usually this ‘command and control’ model evokes questions about people’s privacy. This 
because detection technology calls upon the scenario of ‘Big Brother is watching you’. At the 
same time however, the introduction of this sort of technology often involves the introduction 
of a new information technological network or infrastructure. This leads to an interesting 
paradox. To reduce the safety risks that result from the interaction and the interconnection of 
different kinds op networks and infrastructures, a new infrastructure is connected to the 




4.2 The market: the governance of risk as a problem of self-regulation 
 
In the second model it is recognized that that are considered as facts of the western ‘open’ 
society in the year 2003. This puts in perspective the role and the position of government as 
guardian of society’s stability; government’s space to move is limited. At the same time 
however, the prevention and fighting of safety risks is seen as an assignment for government. 
The steering model that is connected with the approach above is a form of steering at distance. 
Within certain judicial frameworks, the care for safety is seen as a derivative responsibility for 
citizens and companies. But because these frameworks contain standards for processes rather 
than standards regarding the content, citizens and companies have to develop own ways to 
take their responsibility. Examples are compulsory third-party liability insurance for citizens 
and motorists, but also internal environmental care programs for companies and forms of 
certification. 
 
A variation of the model above is where markets are used to deal with risks. Here self-
regulation is also used as steering mechanism. The idea that safety risks are inextricable 
linked with the complexity and the dynamics of western society is further radicalized. This 
radicalization leads to the opinion that corrective and preventive government interventions 
cannot succeed. It is up to individual citizens and companies to raise their own consciousness 
of risks and to take care of them. Safety risks then become liability problems that have to be 
solved by private law. The assumption behind this line of reasoning is that the possible 
financial consequences of such a liability works preventively. When accidents of incidents 
occur, there consequences are covered by (injury) compensations and insurances against 
damage. 
 
Beck (1999) has pointed out that that ‘new’ risks can no longer be assured. Their effects are 
so massively, disastrous and radical that they would cause the bankrupt of the insurance 
branch. This is the reason why insurance companies have changed their insurance contracts 
after the attacks at the WTC in New York on the 11th of September 2001. Now, damages as a 
result of terrorist attacks are no longer covered. 
 
Another instrument within this model is certification. By developing a quality assurance 
system, connected with a system of certification, private companies can prevent the 
occurrence of risks. For more then one reason this is interesting for them. It raises the quality-
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level within the company, but more important, it can also lead to the prevention of various 
liability claims. A well-known example in the Netherlands is Albert Heijn, an international 
supermarket chain. They demand a certain level of quality of their fresh foods (such as meat) 
from their suppliers. These demands are imposed by certification. If a supplier cannot or can 
no longer meet the demands, they will lose their certificate and as a consequence their returns. 
So, safety risks are not covered by the government, but by private enterprises. 
 
 
4.3 The civil society: the governance of risk as a problem of civic competence 
 
In the third and also last model, safety is seen as a collective responsibility of the State, the 
private companies and society. An attempt is made to involve citizens and groups of citizens 
in the safety-issue. Therefore, this safety issues becomes a societal issue. This applies to the 
public debate about safety but also to the (mostly preventive) approach of vulnerabilities that 
are the results of the interaction and interconnectedness of social-organizational, physical and 
technological networks. 
 
The importance of organizing a public debate about the nature and the effects of ‘new risks’ is 
pointed out by Beck (1999). He objects to an approach in which the nature and the effects of 
these risks are over rationalized in econometric models and in measures for prevention and 
correction based upon these models. This suggests an illusion of controllability. As a result, 
certain groups of scientists one-sidedly monopolize the diagnosis of risks. These groups also 
monopolize the way in which knowledge about the risks is presented and the way in which 
these risks are dealt with. Beck also blames politicians and administrators for following these 
groups of scientists. Sometimes, this leads to an ‘iron coalition’ between scientists, politicians 
and administrators that each have an interest in cherishing the earlier mentioned illusion of 
controllability. It is therefore that a plea is made for breaking the monopoly by bringing up 
some alternative perspectives and by setting up platforms for debate and dialogue. These 
platforms are aimed at influencing opinions held by the public and by politicians. 
 
Another approach also tries to involve the citizen in the safety-issue. This by addressing the 
different citizen’s roles played in society. For example citizens can act as private persons and 
as consumers of government services. They then have a direct interest in safety. They can also 
be involved in the issue because they are sincere involved in public affairs (the ‘citoyen’ role). 
An example of this involvement is interactive policymaking. However, it is also interesting to 
look at the information base of citizens, which enables them to actually play the role of co-
supervisor to the government. Safety issues are then seen as a process of co-production of 
policy or supervision. Some instructive examples of this development can already be found in 
the actual practice of supervision. 
 
By means of the Internet and web technology citizens can access government information. 
This enables them to judge for themselves if the quality of measures and actions taken by 
government live up to their own standards and interests. By making this kind of information 
available, the functioning of a policy area becomes more transparent for citizens. By 
introducing the citizen (and interest groups) as co-supervisor, this transparency leads to the 
integration of certain ‘checks and balances’ within the existing system of supervision. 
 
In this case, two examples are interesting. The first is that on the website of the Inspection of 
Education in the Netherlands inspection reports can be found. These reports contain a 
judgment of the quality of elementary schools as well as suggestions for improvements. With 
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this kind of information, parents can make their own well-informed judgments about the 
quality of their child’s school. Also on the basis of this information an appeal can be made 
towards the school governors about the delivered quality and the measures they have taken to 
raise the quality. So in fact this website functions as a stimulus to raise the quality of 
education. A second example has to do with a disaster that took place in the Dutch city of 
Enschede. In May 2000 a big firework plant exploded, taking many lives and devastating a 
complete residential area. As a result, many provinces are developing so called risk registers 
that can be consulted by citizens trough the Internet. In such a register it is possible to check 
which safety risks (following from certain objects or installations such as plants) occur in the 
environment where a citizen lives and works. It is also possible to see the (safety) 
requirements for these objects and installations and the measures taken by them to meet these 
requirements. With this kind of information, citizens can appeal to these measures to 
government as well as to the private companies. Also, such an information base facilitates a 
process of self-organization. Citizens organize themselves around the information as an 
interest group. As such, they can put pressure on government organizations responsible for 
granting permits and on private companies as holders of these permits. 
 
 
5. A strategic agenda: conclusions and tensions 
 
When the risks that follow from notions as interconnectedness and interwoven networks are 
confronted with the different steering models as described in the last paragraph, some 
dilemma’s and tensions come forward. They constitute a political agenda for safety policy 
that is based on vulnerabilities of citizens. 
 
An impossible task: an uncontrollable assignment for government 
The first tension has to do with the degree in which risks can be considered controllable if 
they result from the interaction and interconnectedness between social-organizational, 
physical and technological networks. This is in fact the question if a government is still able 
to fulfill her assignment as guardian of safety in a society of interwoven networks and 
infrastructures. This question is especially relevant when we consider the complexity and the 
dynamics of the issues at stake, the organizational and administrative levels involved and the 
interwoven public and private responsibilities. 
 
The safety chain as instrument: illusion or solution 
In many policy documents on safety the so-called safety chain is put forward as an effective 
instrument for dealing with risks. The concept of a chain is seen as a means to put in order 
different kinds of activities and to improve the sequence of them. According to Beck (1999) 
this leads to cherishing the illusion of predictability and controllability. The question is 
whether the view in which activities are put in sequence of the safety chain is doing justice to 
the earlier mentioned complexity and the dynamics of the issues at stake, the organizational 
and administrative levels involved and the interwoven public and private responsibilities. 
Even from an administrative and organizational view alone, it can be seen that a network of 
organizations (each organization with a different position, interests, assignments, 
responsibilities and competences) is hiding behind each activity within the chain. It is 
interesting to see that also from a chain-oriented approach of safety, usually the preventive or 
repressive measures are molded and shaped on the basis of a specific assignment of a certain 
organization, resulting from legislation and rules. Furthermore, the dominant internal 
orientation of the safety chain approach often neglects the external interaction between 
different kinds of (interwoven) networks and infrastructures.  
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Reduction of complexity: centralization or more variety 
From a steering point of view, the complexity and the dynamics that result from the 
interwoven social-organizational, physical and ICT-networks offer an interesting challenge. 
It’s the question namely if centralizing some of the assignments and responsibilities in the 
field of supervision, can control this complexity. Often, this kind of centralizing also means 
that some kinds of merger of supervisors have to take place. Perhaps is the opposite of 
centralization a more appropriate reaction to the complexity.  Some insights about steering, 
such as the concept of requisite variety (Conant and Ashby, 1970), point out that complexity 
can only be controlled by using complex and varied steering mechanisms. The network 
character of the earlier mentioned risks therefore asks for a network-like organizational 
reaction. This means by definition that many and varied supervisors continue to exist. It is 
important however, that these supervisors are able to maintain open relations with each other. 
It should be prevented that they become introverted.  
 
Safety versus privacy 
Another tension has to do with the trade off between guaranteeing the safety of society and 
respecting the individual privacy of citizens (see i.e. Thaens et. al 2002). For a matter of fact, 
the same tension applies to improving government service to citizens by using modern ICT’s. 
In order to come to a safer society/improved level of service government increasingly uses 
modern information and communication technologies. One can think of the use of smart card 
and transaction technology, the attribution of unique characteristics (biometrics) and the 
observation of persons (using cameras and the tapping of telephone and internet traffic). For 
‘average’ citizens the use of this kind of technologies has important consequences. More data 
are collected and citizens are being observed. Besides that, the information that is collected is 
more often stored, processed/used or exchanged/re-used. Regardless of the fact whether he is 
obtaining services or because he shows divergent behavior compared to ‘average’ citizens, 
these consequences become proportional more strongly when a citizen has more contacts with 
government organizations. For divergent behavior it can be seen that the combination of smart 
cards, unique characteristics and transaction technology creates a process that directly can be 
followed by government. Deviant behavior stands out in those processes and will lead to all 
kinds of additional actions and control. When deviant behavior shows, cumulative effects 
occur in policy measures. These measures then break in on each other. The consequences of 
modern ICT’s further strengthen this process. For example, when the situation of someone 
diverges from an ‘average’ situation, extra control takes place. The information that is 
collected in this control can be used for additional analysis. Also the opportunity for 
additional exchange of information occurs. Of course, before the use of modern ICT’s the 
government also investigated situations that diverged from average. However, the 
investigation was limited to the specific contact between the citizen and government. ICT’s 
has especially consequences on the effects of such an extra control or investigation (Thaens et 
al, 2002). It stretches the context of control and investigation.  
The dilemma therefore is the need for a permanent consideration of the ambitions of 
government (supported by ICT’s) and the infringement these causes on the private life of 
citizens. Special attention is needed for the combination of technologies en policy measures, 
because these can have cumulative effects on the privacy of citizens. 
 
Note 
1. This paper is based on a study, which we have conducted for the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and 
the Environment and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The report is published as: Bekkers, V.J.J.M., M. 
Thaens, V.M.F. Homburg, J. Ragetlie and M. de Rooij, De keerzijde van verbonden netwerken. De relatie 
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overheid-burger in de risicosamenleving (The other side of interconnected networks. The relationship 
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